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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement following the denial of his motion to
suppress, Leo Philip Bonner pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled
substance and misdemeanor resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement. The district
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the
sentence, and placed Mr. Bonner on probation for a period of two years. On appeal,
Mr. Bonner asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The district court, after a hearing on Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress, made the
following findings of fact:
[A]t approximately 6:00 p.m. Officer Mortensen of the Coeur d’Alene
Police Department conducted a traffic stop1 of a purple Toyota 4-Runner.
According to Officer Mortensen he was familiar with this particular vehicle
and it was a known drug vehicle. Officer Mortensen testified that upon
making contact with the driver of the vehicle and its occupants, Mark
Colandonato [the driver], Jordan McElwain, and Leo Bonner (Defendant),
he detected the odor of marijuana and observed a pocket knife in the
center console. Officer Mortensen collected the vehicle’s occupants’
identification information, returned to his vehicle, and requested a backup
officer.
Upon the arrival of a backup officer, Officer Mortensen asked
Mr. Colandonato and Mr. McElwain to exit the vehicle; both men complied
and Officer Mortensen conducted a frisk of each man as he exited. When
Mr. Colandonato exited the vehicle, Officer Mortensen observed a 12”
long silver metal club type object between the driver’s seat and driver’s
side door. When Officer Mortensen frisked Mr. McElwain he located a
small knife on his person.

Officer Mortensen had seen the 4-Runner turn onto the road from a gas station without
coming to a complete stop. (R., p.88.)

1

1

After Mr. Colandonato and Mr. McElwain had exited the vehicle,
Officer Mortensen asked Mr. Bonner to also exit. Mr. Bonner repeatedly
refused, became nervous, and was argumentative. After several refusals,
Officer Mortensen reached into the vehicle to grab Mr. Bonner’s right arm
and only then did Mr. Bonner exit the vehicle. After Mr. Bonner exited the
vehicle, Officer Mortensen conducted a frisk of his person; during the frisk
Officer Mortensen located a meth pipe in Mr. Bonner’s shirt pocket.
After removing the men from the vehicle, Officer Mortensen
conducted a search of the vehicle during which he located additional
paraphernalia and marijuana. Ultimately Mr. Bonner was placed under
arrest for possession of paraphernalia.
(R., pp.104-05 (footnote omitted).
recording of the traffic stop).)

See generally State’s Ex. 2 (copy of the video

Officer Mortensen took Mr. Bonner to the Kootenai

County Public Safety Building, where heroin and methamphetamine were found on
Mr. Bonner’s person. (See R., p.89.)
The State charged Mr. Bonner by Information with two counts of possession of a
controlled substance, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A, and
one count of resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement, misdemeanor, in violation of
I.C. § 18-705. (See R., pp.54-56.) Mr. Bonner pleaded not guilty. (R., p.61.)
Mr. Bonner filed a Motion to Suppress, based on the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 13 and 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. (R., pp.65-66.) The motion to suppress asserted “the State’s warrantless
search, seizure, and arrest was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of the State of Idaho.”

(R., p.65.)

The State filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.67-82.)
At the motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated there was a warrantless
arrest. (R., p.82.) Officer Mortensen testified on behalf of the State. (R., pp.82-86;
2

Tr., Apr. 9, 2015, p.4, L.5 – p.28, L.19.)

Mr. Bonner did not call any witnesses on his

behalf. (Tr., Apr. 9, 2015, p.28, Ls.22-24.) The parties stipulated to the admission of
the video recording of the traffic stop. (R., p.86.)
Following the hearing, Mr. Bonner filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Suppress Evidence. (R., pp.88-100.) The memorandum presented two issues: “A. The
search should be suppressed because the faint odor of marijuana without more
information is not sufficient to search the entire vehicle. And even [i]f probable cause
existed to search the vehicle it did not extend to search of the persons”; and “B. The
Terry Frisk and subsequent evidence must be suppressed because Officer Mortensen
had no articulable suspicion that Mr. Bonner was both armed and presently dangerous
to warrant a pat down.” (R., p.88.)2
The district court then issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.104-13.) According to the district court, “Officer Mortensen
decided to search the vehicle due to the detected odor of marijuana; the Court finds that
pursuant to [State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595 (Ct. App. 2001),] a warrantless search
of the passenger compartment was lawful because the odor of marijuana gave rise to
probable cause.” (R., p.108.) The district court determined that, “[b]ecause the lawful
search of the passenger compartment turned up additional contraband . . . Officer
Mortensen had probable cause to complete a search of the entire vehicle.” (R., p.109
(citing State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 1990).) Thus, the district court found
the search of the car was valid pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. (R., p.109.)

2

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3

The district court made the following findings of fact with respect to the Terry
frisk:
Officer Mortensen testified that at the time of the stop it was dark outside
and the stop occurred under an overpass. Officer Mortensen also testified
that he had had prior contacts with the vehicle, and he can be heard on
[the video recording] advising the backup officer that it was a known drug
vehicle. Officer Mortensen testified that during his initial contact with the
vehicle he observed a pocket knife in the center console; according to
Officer Mortensen this knife was within arm’s reach of all passengers.
Officer Mortensen further testified that when he asked the driver of the
vehicle to exit, he observed an approximately 12” long silver colored type
metal club on the floor between the driver’s seat and door. During a frisk
of passenger Jordan McElwain, Officer Mortensen located an additional
small knife. After making his initial contact with the vehicle’s occupants
Officer Mortensen requested a backup officer to respond to the scene.
Furthermore, as to the Terry frisk of Mr. Bonner, the Court finds that
Mr. Bonner was uncooperative and argumentative with Officer Mortensen
when Officer Mortensen requested he exit the vehicle. Officer Mortensen
testified that Mr. Bonner’s demeanor was extremely nervous. Mr. Bonner
repeatedly refused to exit the vehicle, and did not exit until Officer
Mortensen reached into the vehicle to grab Mr. Bonner’s right arm.
According to Officer Mortensen he had officer safety concerns based upon
Mr. Bonner’s high level of nervousness and noncompliance.
(R., pp.110-11.)
The district found that under the totality of the circumstances “Officer Mortensen
reasonably concluded, based on his observations, that Mr. Bonner may have been
armed and presently dangerous.” (R., p.111.) The district court further found “the
observations of the weapons in the vehicle and Mr. Bonner’s uncooperative and
nervous demeanor, served to further exacerbate Officer Mortensen’s concerns for
officer safety.” (R., p.111.) The district court found “that based on the totality of the
circumstances, Officer Mortensen was entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of
Mr. Bonner’s outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault the officers at the scene.” (R., p.111.) The district court also found “pursuant to
4

the plain feel doctrine, Officer Mortensen was justified in conducting a warrantless
seizure of the pipe from Mr. Bonner’s shirt pocket.”

(R., p.112.) The district court

therefore denied Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress. (R., p.112.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Bonner agreed to plead guilty to
one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and one count
of resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement. (See R., pp.117-18.) Mr. Bonner also
agreed to waive his right to appeal as to conviction. (R., p.118.) The State agreed to a
sentencing recommendation not to exceed a rider. (See R., p.118.) Mr. Bonner’s plea
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.119.) If
Mr. Bonner prevailed on appeal, he would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
(R., p.119.) The district court accepted Mr. Bonner’s guilty plea. (R., p.117.)
For possession of a controlled substance, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed
Mr. Bonner on supervised probation for a period of two years.3 (R., pp.145-49.)
Mr. Bonner filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s judgment.
(R., pp.153-56.)

For the resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement count, the district court imposed a
sentence of eleven days jail, with credit for eleven days served. (R., p.114.)

3
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bonner’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Bonner asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress,

because his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was denied. The Terry frisk of Mr. Bonner was not justified, because the facts known to
the officer would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr. Bonner was
armed and dangerous.
B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court

defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found. State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.

U.S. Const.

Evidence obtained in violation of these

constitutional protections generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of
the illegal government action.

See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518-19 (2012);

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009).

This exclusionary rule “applies to

evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence
discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous
tree.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.

7

Here, the parties stipulated there was a warrantless arrest of Mr. Bonner.
(R., p.82.)

“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively

unreasonable unless if falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.”
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). “When a warrantless search or seizure is
challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.
C.

The Terry Frisk Of Mr. Bonner Was Not Justified, Because The Facts Known To
The Officer Would Not Have Caused A Reasonable Person To Conclude
Mr. Bonner Was Armed And Dangerous
Mr. Bonner asserts his Terry frisk by Officer Mortensen was not justified,

because the facts known to the officer would not have caused a reasonable person to
conclude Mr. Bonner was armed and dangerous.

Generally, a search must be

authorized by a warrant that is based on probable cause, unless one of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement applies. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818. “One such exception is
the pat-down search for weapons acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)].” Id. “Under Terry, an officer may conduct a
limited pat-down search, or frisk, ‘of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his
or her body in an attempt to find weapons.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.)
A Terry frisk “is only justified when, at the moment of the frisk, the officer has
reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating is ‘armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or others’ and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
dispels the officer’s belief.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.) “The test is an objective
one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent
person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger.” Id.

8

“To meet this standard, the officer must indicate specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, in light of his or her experience,
justify the officer’s suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 81819 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although an officer need not possess absolute
certainty that an individual is armed and dangerous, an officer’s inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not enough to justify a frisk.” Id. at 819 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop listed several factors that “influence whether
a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular person
was armed and dangerous,” including
whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a
weapon; whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime
area; and whether the individual made threatening or furtive movements,
indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or
agitated, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs,
was unwilling to cooperate, or had a reputation for being dangerous.
Id. The Court observed “[w]hether any of these considerations, taken together or by
themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of
the circumstances.”

Id.

“For a frisk to be held constitutional, an officer must

demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk support the
conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.” Id.
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the facts known to Officer
Mortensen would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr. Bonner was
armed and dangerous. Although the district court found Mr. Bonner was uncooperative
and nervous (see R., pp.110-11), the district court did not find Mr. Bonner made any
threatening movements, indicated he possessed a weapon, or had a reputation for
9

being dangerous. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819. Mr. Bonner did not have any bulges
in his clothing that resembled a weapon, and the incident did not occur late at night or in
a high crime area. See id. While Officer Mortensen saw a knife and a club in the car
and removed a small knife from the person of Mr. McElwain (see R., p.110), those facts
did not suggest Mr. Bonner presented a risk of danger to the officer.

Cf. State v.

Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662 (2007) (indicating a defendant’s admission he has a knife
does not alone justify a Terry frisk because weapon possession, in and of itself, does
not necessarily mean that a person poses a risk of danger).
Thus,

under

the

totality

of

the

circumstances,

the

facts

known

to

Officer Mortensen would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr. Bonner
was armed and dangerous. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819. The officer’s Terry frisk of
Mr. Bonner was not justified. See id. at 819-20.
In sum, Officer Mortensen’s Terry frisk of Mr. Bonner was not justified. Thus, the
district court erred when it denied Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress, because his
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was denied.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Bonner respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court’s order of judgment and reverse the order which denied his motion to
suppress.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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